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Abstract: Theoretical accounts of genocide and mass atrocity commonly embrace the thesis of norm 
transformation. This thesis holds, first, that individual and institutional participation in such crimes is at 
least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life. It holds, 
second, that preventing future occurrences of such crimes requires changing norms that currently guide the 
actions of particular individual and institutional actors. This paper clarifies, defends, and extends the thesis 
of norm transformation. It clarifies this thesis by providing a general account of the nature and dynamics of 
norms. It defends this thesis against charges of circularity and against the claim that norms are not, in fact, 
fundamental guides to action. Finally, it extends this thesis by arguing that changes in norms before, during, 
and after mass atrocities count among the considerations that ought to be included in assessments of legal 
and moral accountability for such crimes.
Keywords: norm inversion, mass atrocity, genocide prevention, legal accountability, moral accountability, 
extremely violent societies
Theoretical accounts of genocide and mass atrocity commonly embrace some version of the 
thesis of norm transformation. This thesis holds, first, that individual and institutional participation 
in such crimes is at least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social 
and political life. It holds, second, that preventing future occurrences of such crimes requires 
changing norms that currently guide the actions of particular individual and institutional actors. 
Taken together, these two claims put the thesis of norm transformation at the center of ongoing 
efforts to explain and prevent genocide and mass atrocity.
Despite widespread acceptance of the thesis of norm transformation, there is no scholarly 
consensus concerning the nature or dynamics of norms. Political scientists and historians, 
sociologists and legal scholars all operate with distinct conceptions of norms, rarely considering 
whether those conceptions meet the needs of researchers approaching genocide and mass atrocity 
from alternative disciplinary perspectives. This conceptual variation has impeded critical reflection 
on the thesis of norm transformation, and has allowed important challenges to this thesis to go 
unaddressed.
This paper clarifies, defends, and extends the thesis of norm transformation. It clarifies this 
thesis by offering a general account of norms and norm dynamics, and by showing how this account 
can enrich existing explanatory and preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation. It 
defends this thesis against a number of theoretical and practical challenges—including challenges 
to the power of this thesis to help explain historical mass atrocities, and challenges to the efficacy 
of proposed preventive changes in norms. Finally, it extends this thesis by arguing for a third, 
evaluative claim, namely, that changes in norms before, during, and after mass atrocities count 
among the considerations that ought to be included in assessments of legal and moral accountability 
for such crimes. 
In proposing this extension of the thesis of norm transformation, this paper posits a fundamental 
continuity between explanatory, preventive, and evaluative applications of this thesis. The paper 
thus breaks with much recent scholarship on genocide and mass atrocity, within which these 
different aims appear either unrelated or at odds.1 At the same time, the paper acknowledges key 
criticisms of existing modes of assessing legal accountability for mass violence. Those criticisms 
help structure the discussion of the evaluative implications of the thesis of norm transformation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section One uses a case drawn from the annals of National 
Socialist medical practice as the starting point for a general discussion of norms and norm dynamics. 
Norms are defined in terms of three features: their acceptance, their particularity, and their action-
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guiding power. Different types of norm transformations are then distinguished, including norm 
inversion, norm breakdown, and norm emergence.
Section Two examines in more detail existing explanatory and preventive applications of 
the thesis of norm transformation. Applications of both types, it is argued, rely on three basic 
theoretical assumptions. The first assumption is that it is possible to reliably identify differences 
in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments in time. 
The second assumption is that norms have a fundamental, or non-reducible, power to guide the 
actions of individuals and thereby pattern the conduct of groups. The third assumption is that it 
is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms by which particular changes in norms have been, or 
might be, achieved. 
Section Three addresses two significant challenges to current explanatory and preventive 
applications of the thesis of norm transformation. These challenges – termed the circularity 
challenge and the norm-reducibility challenge – target the first two theoretical assumptions about 
norm dynamics mentioned above. In response to these challenges, the paper first argues that 
testimony, broadly construed, offers a source of non-circular evidence concerning historical norm 
transformations. The paper then distinguishes between identity-instituting and identity-vindicating 
norm transformations, and uses this distinction to defuse the second, norm-reducibility challenge.
Section Four turns, finally, to the evaluative extension of the thesis of norm transformation. 
The section frames this extension in terms of the localization of moral and legal responsibility 
for transformations in norms that contribute to mass atrocity. The section first argues that it is 
legitimate to localize—i.e. restrict to some subset of a larger set of qualified parties—attributions of 
moral responsibility for norm transformation in cases where specific mechanisms for transforming 
norms can be identified, and where those changes in norms have had a demonstrable effect on the 
precipitation or prolongation of large-scale wrongs. The section then argues that in cases of society-
wide norm breakdown, as may be found in so-called “extremely violent societies,” localization of 
legal responsibility for mass violence faces a higher justificatory burden, for both historiographical 
and properly juridical reasons.
Norms: Definition and Dynamics 
On 11 September 1940, Dr. Leonardo Conti of the Reich Interior Ministry addressed a letter to 
his former medical school teacher, Professor Gottfried Ewald. Conti’s letter was occasioned by 
Ewald’s critical evaluation and rejection of the secret Nazi euthanasia program, Aktion T4.2 The text 
of Conti’s letter reads as follows:
Dear Professor Ewald, 
 With the deepest gratitude I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 21 August. I still 
remember with great pleasure your lectures in Erlangen.
 Your analysis contains much that is right, I’m sure. Nevertheless, I take a different view, 
although I cannot and will not set it down in writing at this time. I would only like to say, that 
I am fully convinced that the opinions of the entire German Volk concerning these things are 
undergoing a transformation, and I can very easily imagine that things which in one period are 
considered objectionable [verwerflich] can in the next period come to be regarded as the only 
right choice. This is something we have experienced countless times in the course of history. 
As the most recent example I would gently point to the sterilization law: here the process of a 
transformation in thought [Umformung des Denkens] is today already quite far advanced.3
Conti’s letter has commonly been cited as evidence of professional complicity in the Holocaust.4 
The letter is of interest here because of the remarkable historical articulation it offers of the 
thesis of norm transformation. Conti’s letter contemplates transformations in two long-standing 
prohibitions within the medical profession: a prohibition on intentional medical killing and a 
prohibition on involuntary sterilization. In order to better understand these claims, we must first 
clarify the definition of norms. 
Defining Norms
This paper proposes the following general definition of norms:
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Norms are practical prescriptions, permissions, or prohibitions, accepted by members of 
particular groups, organizations, or societies, and capable of guiding the actions of those 
individuals.
 
Several features of this definition demand elaboration. First, it is necessary to explain what 
“acceptance” of a norm entails. Second, it is necessary to explain the significance of the particularity, 
or domain-limitedness, of norms. Third, it is necessary to explain what it means for norms to guide 
actions, and in what ways this can occur. 
In the first place, norms are accepted by individuals. This is the basis of the socio-empirical 
quality of norms—i.e. their status as social facts that can be studied via standard procedures 
of historical and social scientific inquiry.5 Philosophical accounts of norm acceptance vary 
considerably; this paper will not seek to defend any single one of them.6 What is crucial is that any 
adequate account must accommodate a range of different types of norm acceptance, extending 
from relatively formal and explicit acts of acceptance (as in the case of professional oaths, 
university honor codes, and so on) to relatively informal or implicit forms of norm acceptance 
(as in the case of norms governing fair dealing in monetary transactions or gift giving).7 This 
paper is committed, furthermore, to two specific claims about norm acceptance. First, there is a 
substantive difference between following a norm merely in order to avoid sanctions imposed on 
infractions, and following a norm in order to sustain or satisfy properly normative attitudes (such 
as obligation; felt-bindingness, and so on). That difference may constitute, and at least tracks, the 
difference between merely conforming with and actually accepting a norm.8 Second, although it 
may be the case that all norms are, in principle, linguistically expressible, it is not necessarily the 
case that every individual who accepts a certain norm must be able to give a clear verbal account 
of that norm’s requirements.9
In the second place, norms are domain-limited. They circulate within particular groups, 
organizations, and societies. This feature of norms explains the significant role that norms play in 
sustaining shared identities within particular groups, organizations, or societies.10 It is also crucial 
to efforts by historians and social scientists to use norms to explain patterns of collective, rather than 
merely individual, behavior.11 To be sure, the bounds of the collectivities within which particular 
norms circulate are rarely static. The discussion of norm dynamics below aims to account for some 
of the many ways in which those bounds can change.
Finally, norms have the power to guide actions. Exactly how norms perform this central, action-
guiding function is contested. One problem is to understand the cognitive and conative conditions 
under which norms dispose individuals to pursue particular courses of conduct. A second problem 
is to establish distinctions among the different types of actions—ranging from compliant to 
defiant—that can rightly be said to be guided by a given norm.12 While these difficulties should 
not be discounted, the action-guiding power of norms is clearly central to both explanatory and 
preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation.13 Importantly, this paper assumes 
what I call the priority of the practical point of view. Put simply, this assumption holds that 
properly characterizing the contributions of particular norms to the prevention, or precipitation, 
of mass atrocities requires considering how those norms contribute to individuals’ first-personal 
deliberations over plans and courses of conduct. 
How, then, does the definition of norms offered here enrich our understanding of Conti’s 
claims concerning the prohibitions on intentional medical killing and involuntary sterilization? It 
does so in three ways. First, Conti is asking Ewald to believe that, despite continuing widespread 
acceptance of the prohibition on euthanasia within German society, this norm is likely soon 
to change substantially. This claim, in turn, rests on an implicit distinction between the norms 
accepted by medical professionals such as Conti and by members of society at large. Finally, 
Conti appears to be suggesting that his former teacher ought not only to accept the change in the 
norms concerning euthanasia, but to act upon it—either in his role as a professor, or as a hospital 
administrator, or both.14 
Ultimately, the claims set out in Conti’s letter are not just claims about norms, but claims about 
transformations in norms. In order to fully understand these claims, it is necessary to turn from the 
definition to the dynamics of norms.
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Norm Dynamics
The topic of norm dynamics can be divided into two broad classes of questions. First, there are 
questions about the categorization of different types of transformations in norms. Second, there 
are questions about the empirical conditions under which norms are more or less likely to undergo 
transformations of these several types. The analysis offered in this section focuses on questions of 
the first kind. Specifically, it seeks to distinguish between norm inversion, norm breakdown, and 
norm emergence.
Norm Inversion
Norm inversions occur when individuals who previously accepted prohibitions on certain 
actions come to regard those same actions as required, or vice versa. It is possible, in principle for lone 
individuals to experience such radical transformations in normative attitudes and commitments, 
without thereby participating in broader group- or society-level inversions. Nevertheless, historical 
and social scientific claims about norm inversion typically refer to changes in norms accepted in 
the aggregate by members of particular groups, organizations, or societies.15 
Conti’s letter to Ewald offers a remarkably apt description of the dynamics of norm inversion. 
As Conti writes with respect to the existing prohibition on intentional medical killing: “things 
which in one period are considered objectionable can in the next period come to be regarded as 
the only right choice.” The last part of this claim makes clear that Conti has in mind not merely 
the erosion of a prohibition, but rather a shift from a prohibition to a prescription, or normative 
requirement. It is also evident from Conti’s letter that he anticipates not just individual, but group-
level inversions of norms: first among members of the medical profession, ultimately among “the 
entire German Volk.” 
Norm Breakdown
Norm breakdowns occur when previously accepted norms cease to guide actions in fact, 
and cease to be available as guides to action in principle. These two types of transformation are 
logically distinct, but in practice they often occur together.16 When previously prevailing norms 
cease to be reflected in the publically observable actions of large numbers of individuals within a 
particular group, those norms tend to become less useful as guides to action for other members 
of that group. In the accounts of norm breakdown among German professionals under National 
Socialism offered by Konrad Jarausch and Berel Lang, just this dynamic is described.17 
Like other kinds of norm transformations, breakdowns in norms are generally identified at 
the level of groups or populations. However, they cannot be fully understood without considering 
the beliefs and actions of individual actors. When norms break down, they lose their power to 
guide the decisions and actions of individual actors. This can occur for one of a number of reasons. 
Sometimes requisite motivational factors, such as empathy or a sense of fairness, fade. Other times 
norms, and the systems of norms to which they belong, become too complicated or convoluted 
to guide action. Wartime brutalization offers a reason of the first kind for norm breakdown.18 The 
existence of secret or contradictory laws within a repressive state offers a reason of the second 
kind.19 
Norm Emergence
Norm emergence refers to a range of pathways and processes by which new norms arise 
and gain acceptance within particular populations. In this way, norm emergence contrasts with 
both norm inversion and norm breakdown – each of which starts from a condition in which a 
particular norm is already accepted by individuals belonging to a particular group, organization, 
or society. 
Conceptual distinctions among different modes of norm emergence have only recently begun 
to receive sustained attention from scholars. Political scientists have described cases of grafting of 
new norms onto already existing norms, and have emphasized the importance of the work that 
norm entrepreneurs do in facilitating norm emergence.20 Philosophers have analyzed phenomena 
such as the tendentious introduction of norms, and have modeled non-coercive paths of emergence 
for particular cooperation- and coordination-facilitating norms.21
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 Perhaps the most interesting trend in the study of norm emergence has been the rapid increase, 
over the past decades, in case studies of the development of particular norms in international law 
and politics.22 Unlike more general discussions of norm dynamics, many of these case studies 
aim to show how the development of specific norms has helped, or might help, to prevent mass 
violence. In order to better assess such claims we should turn now to examine in more detail the 
thesis of norm transformation. 
The Thesis of Norm Transformation
The thesis of norm transformation combines claims about the explanation and the prevention of 
large-scale crimes. It holds, first, that individual and institutional participation in such crimes is at 
least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life. 
It holds, second, that preventing future occurrences of such crimes requires changing norms that 
currently guide the actions of particular individual and institutional actors.
Efforts by scholars and policymakers to use the thesis of norm transformation to explain, or 
prevent, particular instances of genocide and mass atrocity will be referred to here as applications of 
this thesis. This section will analyze several representative explanatory and preventive applications 
of the thesis of norm transformation. One aim of this analysis is to show how the general account 
of norms and norm dynamics offered above can enrich existing applications of this thesis. Another 
aim is to identify the basic theoretical assumptions underlying such applications. 
 
Explanatory Applications
Reflecting on the Rwandan genocide in a 2004 article, political scientist Lee Ann Fujii directly invokes 
the thesis of norm transformation. “Put simply,” she writes, “genocidal leaders had to transform 
the normative environment [in Rwanda] such that actions that were once considered verboten 
(such as killing thy neighbor) could be viewed as not only legitimate but imperative.”23 Fujii offers 
a social psychological explanation for why such a transformation in norms should accompany 
genocide. “Norms,” she avers, “become more important when reality is confusing, contradictory, or 
changing. The more ambiguous the situation, the more likely people are to rely on norms as guides 
for behavior; and the clearer the prescription of a given norm, the more likely people will follow 
that norm and not others.”24 Throughout her paper, Fujii scans historical records and first-person 
accounts for clues to the particular mechanisms by which “genocide became normalized.”25
Fujii’s invocation of the thesis of norm transformation calls attention to three theoretical 
assumptions that underlie explanatory applications of this thesis. The first assumption is that it is 
possible to reliably identify differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals 
across two or more moments in time. The second assumption is that norms have a fundamental, or 
non-reducible, power to guide the actions of individuals, and consequently to pattern the conduct 
of groups. The third assumption is that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms by which 
particular changes in norms have been, or might be, attained. 
These three assumptions are not restricted to Fujii’s application of the thesis of norm 
transformation. The letter from Dr. Conti discussed above manifests these assumptions. Turning 
to a more contemporary, and scholarly, literature, Christopher Browning’s influential analysis of 
participation by “ordinary men” in mass killings on the Eastern Front during the Second World 
War embodies these assumptions.26
Consider the first assumption identified above. Browning’s study of the members of Reserve 
Police Battalion 101, and his reasons for rejecting the idea that racist ideology or wartime 
brutalization might help to explain their participation in mass atrocity, are too familiar to require 
recapitulation here. What is worth noting is that Browning identifies not one, but two inversions 
in norms accepted by members of this particular unit at different moments in time. Browning first 
posits an inversion in norms regarding killing prior to participation by members of the Police 
Battalion in mass shootings in German-controlled territory in Eastern Europe. He then posits a 
second inversion, in fact a reversion, in the decades following WWII. Browning writes:
to concede that the morally inverted world of National Socialism—so at odds with the political 
culture and accepted norms of the 1960s—had made perfect sense to them at the time, would 
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be to admit that they were political and moral eunuchs who simply accommodate to each 
successive regime. That was a truth with which few [former members of Reserve Police 
Battalion 101] either wanted or were able to come to grips.27
In order to see how the second assumption about norms is implicit in explanatory applications 
of the thesis of norm transformation, it is helpful to consider cases of apparent norm breakdown. 
Argentinean legal scholar Carlos Santiago Nino offers a helpful example in his discussion of 
“institutional anomie” during the Dirty War in his home country. Nino suggests that “judicial 
recognition of the legitimacy of coups d’état and the regime’s ensuing laws is perhaps the clearest 
example” of such anomie. 28 In helping to legitimate such practices, Nino argues, Argentinean courts 
allowed the erosion of crucial rule of law norms such as publicity and consistency in the law.29 
Similar claims about breakdowns in norms governing the conduct of legal actors have been made 
by scholars of legal institutions under National Socialism.30 In each of these cases, the assumption is 
that relevant norms, had they not broken down, could have guided the implicated actors towards 
substantially different courses of conduct. 
Consider, finally, the assumption that it is possible for scholars to pinpoint specific mechanisms 
by which particular changes norms have been, or might be, attained. Here it is appropriate to 
return to Fujii’s 2004 analysis of the Rwandan genocide. Fujii identifies three distinct stages in 
the emergence of what she calls a “genocidal norm.”31 Each stage is associated with different 
mechanisms for provoking norm transformation. First there was a stage of spreading a message of 
social division and threats to the Hutu population from Tutsis. Second was a stage of producing 
objective evidence of those threats, through staged attacks, killings, and so on. Third was a stage of 
making the threats appear imminent, so as to require immediate action.32 
Several of the specific mechanisms for norm transformation that Fujii singles out in these several 
stages have clear analogues in other historical cases of genocide. These include disseminating hate 
propaganda33 and staging “enemy” attacks. Exactly how strong the causal connections between 
such acts and subsequent episodes of mass violence are is contested.34 Even where scholars point 
to different events as contributing to the inversion, emergence, or breakdown of norms, however, 
they share the assumption that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms or processes that 
contribute to such transformations.
Preventive Applications
Preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation rest on the same three theoretical 
assumptions about norm dynamics as explanatory applications. A representative example comes 
from legal scholar Mark Osiel’s 2009 book, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity. After asking how changes 
in the law might “help created and cultivate within modern armies the institutional characteristics 
enabling them to steer clear of mass atrocity,” Osiel suggests that one strategy might be to introduce 
laws imposing civil liabilities on officers whose subordinates take part in atrocities. The imposition 
of civil liabilities, Osiel suggests, avoids the problems of procedural justice that comparable 
criminal liabilities would encounter.35 At the same time, this change in the law directly counters 
existing social norms against “snitching” on fellow members of one’s military unit.36 
Osiel’s proposal clearly depends upon the theoretical assumption that it is possible to reliably 
identify differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more 
moments in time. In this way this preventive application of the thesis of norm transformation 
parallels the explanatory applications discussed above. What is different in this and other preventive 
cases is that the first of these two periods of time is defined as the present, and the second as some 
point in the future.37
The new norm Osiel advances is aimed primarily at individuals, and is closely tied to concrete 
sanctions (in the form of fines) for violations. Neither of these features is essential to preventive 
applications of the thesis of norm transformation. To see this, it is useful to turn to the emerging 
norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and consider its claims to guide actions. 
Unlike Osiel’s proposed legal norm, R2P aims chiefly to guide the actions of states, rather 
than single individuals. And unlike Osiel’s proposed norm, R2P aspires to guide actions even 
in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. Further clarity comes from distinguishing 
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between primary and secondary bearers of responsibilities under R2P. Primary bearers of such 
responsibilities are individual states and state leaders. Secondary bearers are the various state and 
non-state actors composing the international community, who are tasked with taking up protective 
responsibilities when and where primary bearers fail to uphold them. 
Crucially, scholars of R2P avoid describing protective actions by secondary bearers as 
punishments for failures by primary bearers to fulfill their responsibilities.38 Furthermore, as 
Luke Glanville has pointed out, there are currently no legal penalties prescribed for failures by 
secondary bearers to act in cases of malfeasance by primary bearers of responsibility.39 What 
this example shows is that, while preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation 
depend on the assumption that norms have the power to guide actions, both the status of the 
actors guided by such norms and the schemes of accountability supporting such guidance can 
vary substantially. 
Preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation commonly give special attention 
to the mechanisms by which desired transformations are to be achieved. In political science, as 
noted above, scholars have offered numerous studies of the efforts of norm entrepreneurs to change 
norms in order to prevent war and civil conflict.40 In addition to highlighting the accomplishments 
of heroic individuals, such studies suggest that particular events in the domestic or international 
sphere may serve as catalysts for preventive norm transformations. In each of these cases, authors 
assume that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms that have caused, or might in the future 
contribute to, preventive transformations in norms. 
Two Challenges to the Thesis of Norm Transformation
The previous section surveyed some representative explanatory and preventive applications of the 
thesis of norm transformation, and identified three basic theoretical assumptions underlying such 
applications. This section will consider challenges to two of those assumptions. The first challenge, 
called here the circularity challenge, targets the assumption that it is possible to reliably identify 
differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments 
in time. The second challenge, called here the norm-reducibility challenge, targets the assumption 
that norms have a fundamental, or non-reducible, power to guide the actions of individuals, and 
thereby pattern the conduct of groups. 
The Circularity Challenge 
Explanatory applications of the thesis of norm transformation rest in part on the assumption that it 
is possible to reliably identify differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals 
across two or more moments in time. The circularity challenge casts doubt on this assumption. 
It raises questions about the verifiability of claims about the existence of particular at any given 
moment in time. Although charges of circularity can be leveled at claims about the existence of 
norms in the present day, such charges are strongest when applied to historical claims about norms 
or changes in norms. For this reason, it will here be treated as an historiographical challenge to the 
thesis of norm transformation.
Claims about the existence of norms are susceptible to charges of circularity because of the 
evidentiary gap that separates the observed conduct of actors – i.e. the actions that individuals 
undertake – from the unobservable cognitive and conative states of actors – i.e. the beliefs and 
attitudes with which they undertake them. In everyday life it is common to infer information about 
relevant beliefs and attitudes from the actions of individuals. But in the case of purportedly norm-
guided conduct, such inferences threaten to produce a circular course of reasoning, in the following 
manner. First, observed patterns of behavior are taken as evidence of the existence of norms (and, 
by extension, the acceptance of those norms by individuals). Second, these same inferred norms are 
relied on to explain, or account for, those observed patterns of behavior.41 
Some of the most promising strategies for confirming the existence of norms in present-day 
contexts are not available in cases of norms supposed to have existed in the past. Cristina Bicchieri, 
a leading theorist of social norms, has pioneered experimental methods for identifying, and 
measuring the strength of, such norms in present-day political societies.42 These methods depend 
on the experimenters’ ability to control the beliefs subjects have about the types of interactions they 
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are involved in, as well as the experimenters’ ability to change the material incentives that subjects 
have for certain kinds of behavior. So, in experiments designed to analyze norms of fairness, 
subjects may be selectively fed information about the past behavior of their experimental partners; 
or they may be told that the experiment has been designed in such a way as to prevent partners 
from detecting unfair divisions of monetary rewards.43
Experiments of this kind are clearly not feasible when it comes to the study of norms supposed 
to have existed in historical contexts.44 There are, however, other sources, besides the actions of 
historical individuals themselves, which can provide evidence of the existence of norms that might 
help to explain those actions. Two of the most important of these sources, already much discussed 
in the literature on genocide and mass atrocity, are documents and testimony.45 
Holocaust scholars have extensively debated the relative merits of documents and testimony 
as sources of historical knowledge about this genocide. Leading figures such as Raul Hilberg 
and Robert Wolfe have insisted on the primacy of documents created by the National Socialists 
themselves as sources of information concerning the plan and execution of their genocidal 
policies.46 Such documents do indeed provide evidence of norms, and changes in norms. One 
important example concerns the language rules developed by various parties within the military 
and political hierarchies to conceal the truth about the policies of deportation and mass killing, 
both from the targets of such policies and from third parties. The existence of letters and memos in 
which particular officials were reprimanded for failing to conform to such language rules seems to 
provide non-circular evidence for the existence of such rules, which, as I have argued elsewhere, 
may have taken on the status of social norms. 47 
For Hilberg, the evidentiary advantage of documents over testimony was decisive. As Yehuda 
Bauer has argued, however, prioritizing documents produced by the authors of the plan of 
destruction threatens to distort the historical record in another way, by leaving out large segments 
of the experience of the groups and communities occupied or terrorized by the National Socialists 
and their allies. Treating testimony as a source of historical knowledge is not unproblematic, Bauer 
admits, but it is a mistake to think that historiographical quality is unequivocally improved by 
excluding it.48 
If testimony is admitted as a source of historical knowledge, then it provides a second route 
to overcoming the circularity challenge to claims about the existence of norms in historical 
contexts.49 It’s important to be clear as to the bounds, and limits, of this resource. As Bauer points 
out, testimony will be most reliable when multiple individuals provide consistent testimony 
concerning the existence or influence of a particular fact or event.50 In the context of discussions 
of norms, numbers are important in part because it is always possible for single individuals to be 
mistaken about what norms are accepted by other individuals in a particular context. An example 
may help to illustrate this point. Consider a case reported by the German Jewish academic Victor 
Klemperer in his important diaries of daily life in Dresden under National Socialism. In his diary 
entry for June 13, 1934, Klemperer shares an anecdote concerning the consequences of boycotts of 
Jewish-owned business in three neighboring towns outside Dresden:
In Falkenstein one is not allowed to buy from the “Jew.” And so the people in Falkenstein 
travel to the Jew in Auerbach. And the Auerbachers in turn buy from the Falkenstein Jew. 
However, on bigger shopping expeditions the people from the one-horse towns travel to 
Plauen, where there’s a larger Jewish department store. If you run into someone from the 
same town, no one has seen anyone. Tacit convention.51
Do Klemperer’s observations count as evidence of the existence of an emerging rule of behavior 
in this region at this period, and if so, what is the strength that evidence? Because this is a diary 
entry, rather than a piece of courtroom testimony or an oral reminiscence from well after the fact, 
certain kinds of criticisms do not apply. Klemperer’s report could hardly be motivated by a desire 
to exculpate himself for some wrongdoing (as courtroom testimony might); nor can this report be 
distorted by the clouding effects of time. Nevertheless, it is a genuine question whether Klemperer 
was correct in his claims about both the actions, and the intentions, of non-Jewish residents of 
these towns, and the evidentiary quality of his claim would be heightened if it were joined by 
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testimony from other individuals from the area confirming this point. To gain fully dispositive 
evidence of a norm governing this specific practice, it might also be necessary to acquire testimony 
regarding certain counter-factual claims, such as the claim that at least some of the shoppers in 
this region would have acted in this way even if the instrumental reasons for doing so (i.e. fear of 
stigmatization or criticism) were removed.52 To my knowledge, such supplementary testimony 
does not exist concerning this particular, highly localized convention. It should, however, be 
possible to find multiple testimonies to the existence of other kinds of norms during the Holocaust 
and other episodes of genocide and mass atrocity.53 In this way, then, it seems possible to overcome 
the circularity challenge to explanatory applications of the thesis of norm transformation using 
documents and testimony.
The Norm-Reducibility Challenge
Whereas the circularity challenge targets the assumption that it is possible to reliably identify 
differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments 
in time, the norm-reducibility challenge targets the assumption that norms have a fundamental, or 
non-reducible, power to guide the actions of individuals, and consequently to pattern the conduct 
of groups. Here I will focus on the argument for norm reduction recently set forth by political 
scientist Kristen Renwick Monroe.
In her 2012 book, Ethics in an Age of Terror and Genocide, Monroe aims to show how individuals’ 
identities, worked out in the context of specific social relationships, constrain the range of choices 
available during moral decision-making. 54  Three concepts are crucial to Monroe’s model of moral 
choice. First is the concept of identity. Drawing on the findings of social identity theory within 
social psychology, Monroe suggests that differences in identity do much to explain the different 
actions of perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers in contexts of genocide and mass atrocity. One 
of the key claims here is that individuals who conceive of their identity as more extensive, i.e. 
as bearing broader connections with other individuals across space and time, are more likely to 
perceive threats to the well-being of those others as morally salient, and thus as presenting an 
opportunity for moral choice.55 
While identity constrains determinations of moral salience, the determinations themselves are 
reached through the cognitive process of categorization. Monroe defines this second key concept 
as “the process by which ideas and objects are recognized, differentiated, or distinguished from 
one another and then understood.”56 Her model construes cognitive categorization as operating in 
several distinct stages. First, out of the manifold data of experience, cognitive categorization settles 
the particular ways in which particular situations will be framed for particular actors. Particular 
modes of framing, in turn, lead to the activation, or suppression, of particular scripts for behavior. 
These scripts, finally, count as the proximate causes of observed conduct.57
The third major concept in Monroe’s model of moral choice is that of cognitive stretching. This 
concept seeks to capture the fact that patterns of categorization can change over time, in response 
to a variety of environmental or social factors. Put differently, cognitive stretching seeks to explain 
how situations or events that at one time seem to be morally salient for particular individuals can 
subsequently cease to be categorized in this way, or vice-versa.58 
Monroe clearly believes that it is possible to reliably identify differences in the norms accepted 
by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments in time. She also clearly believes 
it is possible to pinpoint mechanisms by which transformations in norms are brought about—
citing for example Christopher Browning’s account of the effects of isolation, propaganda, and 
manipulation on German police officers recruited for mass killings.59 Monroe thus accepts two 
of the three theoretical assumptions behind the thesis of norm transformation. Her empirically 
grounded model of moral choice challenges the remaining assumption, however, by suggesting 
that norms are not fundamental as guides to action. 
To the extent that Monroe’s model explicitly addresses the ability of norms to guide decisions 
and actions, it suggests that they do so non-reflectively. Her entire account is designed to call into 
question moral theories that focus on deliberation and rational reflection on right and wrong action. 
Indeed, the central framing device for her study is the idea that both bystanders and resisters of 
genocide tend to claim that they had “no choice” in acting or failing to act.60 
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A second, and more consequential, feature of Monroe’s model is the claim that the acceptance 
of norms often occurs unreflectively, and may be difficult to raise to the level of conscious awareness 
or reflection. Monroe argues that an individual’s identity, or self-conception, largely determines 
both which facts about the world that individual recognizes as morally salient, and which choices 
seem available to that individual in the face of such facts.61 
Both of these claims are, in principle, compatible with the thesis of norm transformation, 
though they provide a very different picture of both the acceptance of norms and the way in which 
norms guide action than has been presented so far in this paper. There is, however, a case to be 
made that, on Monroe’s model, norms themselves are not decisive for understanding moral choice 
in the context of mass atrocity. Norms are not fundamental to the explanation of individual and 
group conduct during large-scale crimes, since both cognitive processes of categorization and, 
before this, social processes of identity formation seem to be doing most of the explanatory work. 
And norms are not fundamental to the prevention of large-scale crimes, since what really seems 
to be important is changing individuals’ self-conceptions, and in this way altering the categories 
they deploy and the facts or events that they take to be legally or morally salient.62 This, in my 
view, is the strongest statement of the challenge that Monroe’s theory offers to the thesis of norm 
transformation.
In responding to this challenge, I will argue that the acceptance of norms is not merely a 
consequence of, but also often constitutive of, individual and group identities.63 That is to say, 
changes in the set of practical prescriptions, permissions, or prohibitions that one accepts can 
serve as conditions for claiming, or maintaining a claim upon, particular identities. Two particular 
types of changes in norms are worth distinguishing here. First are identity-instituting norm 
transformations. These are changes in norms that serve as conditions for the adoption of new 
identities. Second are identity-vindicating norm transformations. These are changes in norms that 
serve as conditions for preserving, in the face of some significant threat, existing identities. 
How do identity-instituting norm transformations bear on theories of genocide and mass 
atrocity? Here again the National Socialist euthanasia program, Aktion T4, is instructive. As Henry 
Friedlander has shown, the ideas and ideologies that stood behind the euthanasia program had 
existed in Germany (and indeed, in countries outside of Germany, including the United States) 
well before the rise of the Nazi movement.64 In terms of changing norms, particularly legal norms, 
to reflect these ideas and ideologies, however, it was specifically the political takeover of power 
by Hitler that “made the implementation of the race hygiene utopia possible.”65 It is this utopian 
aspect of the Nazi policy towards the disabled, emphasized by historian Eric Weitz, that makes it 
appropriate to consider the relevant changes in laws regarding so-called “life unworthy of life” as a 
form of identity-instituting norm transformation: a change in norms coinciding with, and regarded 
at the time as a condition for, the development of a new Völkisch identity.66 Claudia Koonz has 
perhaps gone furthest in suggesting that it was identity-instituting changes in norms, rather than 
the broader racist or ableist ideologies with which those changes were connected, that distinguished 
National Socialist political culture from that of other contemporary political societies.67
Shifting to identity-vindicating norm transformations, it is useful to consider the Nuremberg 
Code of medical ethics, promulgated in the first so-called “Successor Trial” at Nuremberg. While 
chief prosecutor Telford Taylor considered it possible to “pass very briefly over matters of medical 
ethics” in his opening statement at this Doctors’ Trial, retrospective accounts have called the 
Nuremberg Code “the most important document in the history of the ethics of medical research.”68 
Chiefly at issue in the Nuremberg Code is the requirement that doctors obtain voluntary and 
adequately informed consent from prospective research subjects. As historian Paul Weindling has 
pointed out, a major aim of the scientists and physicians who assisted Taylor in developing his 
prosecutorial strategy was to avoid “too strong a denunciation of Nazi medicine [which] might 
jeopardize their own position,” and to articulate “conditions under which risky experimentation 
was ethically permissible.”69 
The development of the principle of informed consent, on this reading, is an example of an 
identity-vindicating norm transformation. It is a norm that had not been clearly articulated, or 
broadly accepted, prior to WWII, but which became part of the basis of the continuing legitimacy of 
the medical profession after that conflict. Importantly, this change in norms was not so radical as to 
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completely disrupt or destroy the existing identity of medical professionals; it allowed physicians 
to continue drawing on a tradition of medical experimentation designed to improve future care, 
even while suggesting that certain past methods of research were not longer permissible.70
The discussion of identity-instituting and identity-vindicating norm transformations offered 
above has shown that norms, and changes in norms, cannot be eliminated from an identity-based 
account of moral choice on the basis of the non-fundamentality objection. This finding is significant 
for both explanatory and preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation. It also helps 
to establish the legitimacy of evaluative applications of the thesis of norm transformation, to which 
I now turn. 
Extending the Thesis of Norm Transformation
Scholars of genocide and mass atrocity regularly register tensions between efforts to explain, 
prevent, and pursue accountability for participation in large-scale crimes.71 Some go further, and 
suggest that questions of accountability, or moral and legal responsibility for large-scale crimes, 
necessarily conflict with efforts to understand and prevent such crimes, and consequently ought 
to be deferred.72 
While recognizing the reasons behind these calls for caution, this paper takes a different view. 
The thesis of norm transformation establishes a fundamental continuity between explanatory, 
preventive, and evaluative approaches to genocide and mass atrocity. If the three basic assumptions 
underlying the explanatory and preventive applications of this thesis are indeed tenable—if it is 
possible to non-circularly identify changes in norms, if norms play a non-reducible role in guiding 
action, and if it is possible to identify specific processes through which norms have been, or might 
be, transformed—then it is important to consider the implications for efforts to hold individuals 
and groups accountable for participation in large-scale crimes. This section briefly discusses two 
such implications. The first concerns strategies for localizing moral responsibility for mass atrocity. 
The second concerns obstacles to localizing legal responsibility for such wrongs.
Localization of Moral Responsibility
To localize responsibility for wrongdoing is to restrict attributions of responsibility to some subset of 
a larger set of qualified parties. Some ways of localizing responsibility – such as holding executives 
responsible for the success or failure of corporations and other institutions—typically strike us as 
legitimate. Other ways of localizing responsibility—such as scapegoating in its various guises—
are by definition illegitimate. A key factor in assessing the legitimacy of any proposal to localize 
responsibility consists in the degree of effective control that particular individuals exercised, or 
were capable of exercising, over the decisions and actions of other individuals.73   
This paper proposes the following principle for localizing moral responsibility for mass 
atrocities. Where specific mechanisms for transforming norms can be identified, and where those 
transformations in norms have had a demonstrable effect on the precipitation or prolongation 
of large-scale wrongs, then it may be appropriate to hold individuals involved in designing or 
implementing such mechanisms morally responsible for doing so. 
Two examples will clarify the range and limits of this principle. The first, already referred to 
above, is the development of a coded language for describing the torture and killing of the disabled, 
Jews, political prisoners, and other persecuted groups under National Socialism. The second is the 
profusion of hate propaganda that commonly accompanies large-scale wrongs. 
Each of these mechanisms has been identified as contributing to what James Waller calls “a 
culture of cruelty that helps [perpetrators] initiate, sustain, and cope with their extraordinary 
evil.”74 If such assessments are accurate, then it seems appropriate to hold individuals responsible 
for developing and deploying such mechanisms. Localizing responsibility for changes in norms 
in this way does not absolve other individuals of responsible from particular wrongful acts, such 
as killing, torture, or theft. Instead, it introduces a new layer of responsibility specifically aimed at 
addressing the specific wrong of transforming the normative landscape. In assessing responsibility 
for such norm transformations, standard criteria for moral responsibility, including intent, 
knowledge, and ability to actually accomplish the transformations contemplated, will need to be 
considered. But there is no reason to think that these criteria pose greater barriers to attributions of 
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moral responsibility for instigating norm transformations than they do for assessing responsibility 
for other kinds of contributions to mass atrocities.75
Importantly, this principle pushes for the localization of moral, rather than legal, 
responsibility for norm transformations. It is unlikely that international courts or tribunals would 
ever countenance a crime of transforming the normative landscape as such – though certain 
mechanisms for doing so (such as the spread of hate propaganda) have been criminalized in 
international law.76 In part, this is because of the different epistemologies, or ways of knowing 
and proving, employed by law and by other moral and historical discourses.77 In part, this is 
because courts and justice systems simply are not designed to deal with the problem of assigning 
responsibility in cases where infractions are normal, rather than exceptional, as the next section 
will suggest.
Rethinking Localization of Legal Responsibility
A second evaluative implication of the thesis of norm transformation can be framed in the form of a 
critique of current practices of localizing legal responsibility for mass atrocity. This critique builds 
on historian Christian Gerlach’s doubts about the explanatory value of the concept of genocide.78 
Gerlach contends that thinking about mass violence in terms of genocide undermines, rather 
than enriches, historical understanding. More specifically, he argues that “genocide is an action-
oriented model designed for moral condemnation, prevention, intervention, or punishment,” 
which unduly “restricts the analysis” of large-scale violence.79 Gerlach’s positive project is to show 
that mass violence is more pluralistic in its targets and perpetrators, more complex in its planning 
and execution, than genocide-oriented studies acknowledge.80
Gerlach’s analysis of the complex causes of mass violence embraces the thesis of norm 
transformation. In extremely violent societies, he observes, “ethical norms and values are 
devalidated not only among persecutors or profiteers, but also among the vulnerable groups. This 
leads to atomization, betrayal, corruption, opportunism, ignorance, and cruelty.”81 What is novel is 
Gerlach’s emphasis on cross-cutting breakdowns in norms governing social, political, and religious 
life. 
This way of understanding mass violence, with its emphasis on “social processes that can only 
partially be controlled by any government,” runs counter to efforts to localize legal responsibility 
within a relatively small group of governmental actors.82 As explained above, one criterion for the 
legitimacy of any effort to localize responsibility is the vesting of control over events in particular 
individuals. This is just what the notion of extremely violent societies denies. 
Gerlach suggests that the concept of genocide itself localizes legal responsibility for large-
scale crimes in ways that may be justified on instrumental, though not historiographical, grounds. 
“Punishment has to be limited,” he writes. “To admit that all sorts of groups, organizations and 
individuals participated in mass violence runs counter to the attempt to restore social peace and to 
find values based on which society may live together in [the] future.”83 
If the general analytical framework of this paper is correct, then Gerlach’s perspective on 
the relationship between of historical analysis and policies aimed at prevention or punishment 
seems too pessimistic. These different undertakings can and should inform each other; challenges 
encountered in the course of the one endeavor should prompt revisions in approaches to the other. 
Legal scholar Mark Drumbl argues to this effect in his book Atrocity, Punishment, and International 
Law.84 There, Drumbl suggests that the model of individual criminal responsibility, grounded in 
assumptions about the prosecution of socially deviant action, is ill fitted to cases of mass atrocity 
characterized by widespread societal participation and support. He proposes a more pluralist 
approach to attributions of legal responsibility, one that accommodates a variety of democratically 
responsive forms of criminal and civil proceedings. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess Drumbl’s specific policy suggestions. One 
takeaway from his analysis, however, is that localization of legal responsibility for mass atrocities 
in a small group of leading actors can be as problematic from a legal perspective as it is distortive 
from a historiographical point of view. That is a finding that coincides with this paper’s basic claim 
that explanatory, preventive, and evaluative applications of the thesis of norm transformation are, 
in principle, compatible. 
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Conclusion
The thesis of norm transformation is powerful and provocative. It provokes by asking us to 
acknowledge the mutability of the basic norms that structure political societies—including our 
own societies. In return, it offers a powerful framework for making sense of crimes that strain 
comprehension and defy censure. 
The thesis of norm transformation does not compel a choice between explanatory, preventive, 
and evaluative priorities in the face of mass atrocity. Instead, it posits a fundamental continuity 
between these different aims. It suggests that they are not just compatible, but may even be 
complementary.
Important questions remain about how the thesis of norm transformation should be applied 
with respect to particular episodes of genocide and mass atrocity. Some of these questions are 
historiographical. Others concern institutional design. Still others are legal or moral. Rather 
than seeking to settle these questions, this paper has clarified, defended, and extended the set 
of concepts on which scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds can draw when pursuing 
answers. Ultimately, Raphael Lemkin’s observation concerning genocide applies to large-scale 
crimes more generally: “the examination of the problem is not limited to one branch of science, but 
claims the support of many.”85
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